Nationalist and Power-Seeking Leadership Preferences in Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: A Measurement Framework with Applications to the Break-Up of Yugoslavia

Appendix: Ideal-Types and Templates for Leadership Preferences

Note: This Appendix is intended for on-line publication, as a supplement to the main article.

Below we provide the seven filled-in templates for the seven executive leaderships involved in the 14 potential conflict initiations examined in the former Yugoslavia in 1990-1995. At the bottom of each template, there is a classification of leadership preferences on a five-point scale on the non-nationalist-to-extreme-nationalist dimension, and on a three-point scale on the principled-to-unprincipled dimension. Ideal-types for points along each scale are described below. Construction of such ordinal scales is only one way of summarizing the variation in the templates. Other approaches may be reasonable.

Recall that information on the dependent variable or variables of interest may not be used to code leadership preferences. There are two ways to exclude such information. First, it is possible to exclude all information classified in the templates under the second heading: "*Actions* indicating the *nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined." Second, it is possible to exclude only the information related to the particular dependent variable or variables of interest. In this paper, the outcome of interest is war onset. In the templates, we have italicized this information within each cell containing information about actions. The pros and cons of each approach are discussed in the article. Here we did not use the italicized information about war onset actions in making the preference classifications. We also note that there was no example in which the information about actions other than war onset changed preference classifications from what they would have

been in the absence of such information. In other words, information about actions other than war onset was consistent with the other information in the templates. But this does not allow us to conclude that gathering information about actions is superfluous in general.

In gathering information for the templates, we used two main source types: periodicals and scholarly secondary works. Each one has its comparative strengths. Periodicals offer more detailed coverage, particularly in accumulating information consistently across long time-spans. Secondary works are more focused on explaining outcomes such as war onset, and therefore are more likely to gather diverse types of information into coherent analytical narratives. Analytical blind spots of particular secondary works are best remedied by consulting other secondary works. We found that the two types of source complemented one another in gathering the full range of information called for by the templates.

Five Ideal-Typical Categories for Nationalist Preferences Dimension

1) Non-nationalist:

a) *Statements and actions directly indicating preferences:* In official statements and actions, there is no significant interest in collective political goals. For the outsider group, these would be independence, or institutional and cultural autonomy; and for the dominant group or groups, expulsion or assimilation of the outsider group. Goals pursued and methods used are similar for political organizations representing both dominant and outsider ethnic groups.

b) *Emphasis on collective goals and treatment of other ethnic groups:* Normatively, pursuit of collective goals of both dominant and outsider groups are discouraged. There is no significant

effort to elicit support for collective goals from either own or other groups. Individual rights of the ethnic other are strictly respected.

c) *War outcomes:* During violent conflict, ethnic cleansing of out-groups is extremely unlikely to be initiated or reciprocated, even if it is feasible and likely to advance important goals. Systematic terrorism and mass killings of out-group civilians are extremely unlikely.

d) *Political organization:* Within dominant political organization leaderships, collective goals are either ignored or discouraged.

2) Moderate nationalist:

a) *Statements and actions directly indicating preferences:* In official statements and actions, independence or assimilation goals may exist theoretically. Maximal and intermediate collective goals are valued. But there is a dominant emphasis on coexistence and improvement under existing conditions, while avoiding significant political confrontations and economic disruptions. Political pressure may be used to bargain for institutional and policy changes within the existing political system, but there is little or no use of violence or even extra-political activities such as protests and strikes. War would not be threatened, initiated, or continued except to achieve the highest collective goals—such as independence—and even then only if success was viewed as highly likely.

b) *Emphasis on collective goals and treatment of other ethnic groups:* Normatively, collective goals of own group are prioritized; but there is also tolerance of collective goals of other groups. Efforts to elicit civilian support for collective goals do not involve violence or even extraordinary political tactics, but are limited to ordinary politics.

c) *War outcomes:* During violent conflict, ethnic cleansing of out-groups is extremely unlikely to be initiated, and unlikely to be reciprocated, even when it is feasible and likely to advance important goals. Systematic terrorism and mass killings of out-group civilians are extremely unlikely.

d) *Political organization:* Within dominant political organization leaderships, moderate nationalist views are encouraged but not enforced.

3) Ordinary nationalist:

a) *Statements and actions directly indicating preferences:* In official statements and actions, there is an active interest and policy agenda aimed at independence or state-sponsored assimilation, as well as other collective goals such as territorial autonomy and cultural policies. Both maximal and intermediate goals are highly valued, so that compromise is acceptable if the costs of pursuing maximal goals are much higher. In threatening, initiating, or wanting to persist with war, either a strong probability of success, or a significant probability of success at relatively low cost, would be necessary.

b) *Emphasis on collective goals and treatment of other ethnic groups:* Normatively, collective goals of own group are prioritized; and collective goals of other groups are discouraged, but individual rights of other-group members are defended. Efforts to elicit civilian support for collective goals do not involve violence, but may involve extraordinary political tactics.

c) *War outcomes:* During violent conflict, ethnic cleansing of out-groups is unlikely to be initiated, but may be reciprocated, where it is feasible and likely to advance important goals. Systematic terrorism and mass killings of out-group civilians are extremely unlikely.

d) *Political organization:* Within dominant political organization leaderships, ordinary nationalist views are encouraged but not enforced.

4) Strong nationalist:

a) *Statements and actions directly indicating preferences:* In official statements and actions, there is an active interest and policy agenda aimed at independence or state-sponsored assimilation, as well as other collective goals. The value of intermediate goals is discounted relative to the maximal goals, such as independence on all contested homeland territory. But lesser goals are sufficiently valued so as to make compromise possible. In threatening, initiating, and wanting to persist with war, high costs are acceptable if there is a significant chance of victory, but not if there is little prospect of success.

b) *Emphasis on collective goals and treatment of other ethnic groups:* Normatively, collective goals of own group are strongly prioritized; collective goals of other groups are strongly discouraged; individual rights of other-group members would ordinarily be accepted, but in practice are likely to be restricted where they are viewed as threatening own-group collective goals. Efforts to elicit civilian support for collective goals may involve violence; but violence is likely to be targeted primarily at organized political institutions and groups and military formations of the rival group. Actions aimed at individuals and civil society organizations are unlikely to go beyond extraordinary political tactics; but there may be some informal tolerance or even support for violence against out-groups.

c) *War outcomes:* During violent conflicts, formal or informal ethnic cleansing may be initiated, and is highly likely to be reciprocated against out-groups, where it is feasible and likely to

advance important goals; systematic terrorism and mass killings of out-group civilians are unlikely.

d) *Political organization:* Within dominant political organization leaderships, strong nationalist views are a prerequisite for high positions. Internal democracy is possible, but is likely to be restricted if it threatens incumbent leadership goals.

5) Extreme nationalist:

a) *Statements and actions directly indicating preferences:* In official statements and actions, there is an active interest and policy agenda aimed at independence or state-sponsored assimilation or expulsion, as well as other collective goals. The value of intermediate goals is heavily discounted relative to the maximal goals (such as independence on all contested homeland territory). In threatening, initiating, and wanting to persist in war, there is a will to pursue maximal goals at almost any cost with little short-term prospect of success.

b) *Emphasis on collective goals and treatment of other ethnic groups:* Normatively, collective goals of own group are strongly prioritized; collective goals of other groups are totally excluded; individual rights of other-group members are likely to be restricted in principle as threatening to own-group collective goals. Violence is likely to be targeted not only at organized political institutions and groups and military formations of the rival group, but also against own-group organized political institutions and against individuals and civil society organizations of both groups.

c) *War outcomes:* During violent conflicts, formal or informal ethnic cleansing is very likely to be initiated as well as reciprocated against out-groups, where it is feasible. Systematic terrorism against out-groups is likely, and mass killings also may be conducted.

d) *Political organization:* Within dominant political organization leaderships, extreme nationalist views are strictly enforced for all positions. Internal democracy is extremely unlikely.

Three Ideal-Typical Categories for Principled-Unprincipled (Power-Seeking) Dimension

1) Strongly principled:

a) Apparent commitment to principle: An ideologue. Near-absolute commitment to one or more political goals. Uncommon in professional politicians.

b) Riskiness and consistency of behavior: Expect frequent evidence of will to risk power or personal safety in pursuit of core goals. Expect near-absolute consistency in pursuit of core goals and priorities, as well as near-absolute consistency of strategies with stated core goals and priorities.

c) Political organization: Within own organization, strong emphasis on recruitment of other purely principled leaders, including those of independent political stature.

d) Corruption: No personal corruption expected; client corruption strongly discouraged. Client corruption acceptable only if viewed as a necessary evil in service of substantive political goals.

2) Balanced:

a) Apparent commitment to principle: A typical career politician. Significantly committed to one or more particularly substantive political goals. But willing to trade off many supposedly core political goals for a large enough political advantage.

b) Riskiness and consistency of behavior: Expected to avoid risks to power or personal safety except when core priorities are significantly concerned. Expect moderate consistency in pursuit

of core goals and priorities, as well as moderate consistency of strategies with stated core goals and priorities.

c) Political organization: Within own organization, strong emphasis on recruitment of leaders that are both principled and effective, including those of independent political stature.

d) Corruption: Little personal corruption expected. Client corruption acceptable if viewed as serving substantive political goals and power goals.

3) Strongly Unprincipled or Power-seeking:

a) Apparent commitment to principle: An opportunist. No convincing commitment to any substantive political goals. Willing to sacrifice all supposedly core political goals for a significant political advantage.

b) Riskiness and consistency of behavior: Expect no evidence of will to risk power or personal safety in pursuit of goals. Expect pronounced inconsistency in pursuit of core goals and priorities, as well as pronounced inconsistency of strategies with stated core goals and priorities—where inconsistency delivers short-term political advantage.

c) Political organization: Within own organization, emphasis on top-down loyalty at the expense of political effectiveness. Desire to maintain top-down control of organization leads to predominance of "yes-men," which tend to be drawn heavily from relatives and personal networks.

d) Corruption: Personal corruption common except where it threatens power. Client corruption a primary mechanism of serving power goals.

Leadership Templates for Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts

Table A1. Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Croatia

Indicator	Executive Leadership: Franjo Tudjman
Moderate vs. Extreme Nationalist Dimension:	
1) *Statements* indicating *the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs.	In 1989, principal founder of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the main center-right party that prioritized nationalist goals (independence) more than economic and political reforms of the Yugoslav system. Pursued independence peacefully, but ultimately with a stated will to initiate use of force to seize and defend it. This demand was initially couched, jointly with Slovenian leaders, in terms of transforming Yugoslavia into a confederation of sovereign states. Prior to declaring independence, Tudjman was more cautious than Slovenian leaders in unilaterally moving towards statehood; nevertheless, he declared in advance that, failing an agreement by June 1991, Croatia would declare independence (Andrejevich, 2 November 1990, 30-1; Andrejevich, 22 February 1991, 37; Andrejevich, 15 March 1991, 27-8). Use of force to achieve independence feasible but not easy, given collapse of all-Yugoslav institutions and high Croatian state capacity on one hand, but large internal, border-concentrated Serb minority and determined support from Serbia proper and Bosnian Serbs. Support for cultural but not political autonomy for Croatian Serbs (Andrejevich, 4 May 1990, 37; Andrejevich, 14 September 1990, 41; Moore, 11 September 1991, 37). Croatian Serb Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) leader Rasković: Tudjman "'…represents what most Croats accept….' He opined that Tudjman was 'Croato-centric,' but no Ustasha. His real hatred was reserved for the communists…" (Andrejevich, 14 September 1990, 41-2; Tanner 2001, 224). Yet Tudjman praised Tito for keeping Yugoslavia independent (Silber and Little 1996, 86). Before and after coming to power in April 1990 elections, Tudjman presided over an ideologically broad party, in which he effectively maintained a pivotal, dominating authority position (Goldstein 1999, 211-2; Tanner 2001, 230). "Tudjman's HDZ was a broad church, more a movement than a party, of moderate and extreme nationalists. Tudjman spanned both wings" (Silber and Little 1996, 96; also Goldstein 1999, 212). "Tudjman considered it was his historic mission to create an independent Croatian state and he found compromise on this issue extremely difficult" (Goldstein 1999, 215). Although condemned Ustashe as "fascist

criminals," argued that fascist state advanced legitimate goal of Croatian statehood, and reportedly said, "Thank God my wife is not a Jew or a Serb" (Silber and Little 1996, 86). New constitution removed official recognition of Serbs as a "co-official" nationality, made widespread nationalist changes in symbols and names, maintained politicization of state media, and purged many Serbs from police and civil service. In meeting with Rasković, offered to consider Serb autonomy proposals, but did little in practice to reassure Serbs (Moore, 6 September 1991, 33). "One must ask whether the Croatian authorities could have prevented the Serb insurrection and the war if they had followed a more considered policy: probably they could not have done so….However, fewer of them could have joined the other side if Croatian policy had been more intelligent, and the overall damage would have been less" (Goldstein 1999, 216-7). Tudjman tried to get Rasković to enter his government. Rasković demanded equal titular status of Serbs with Croats within Croatia, rather than a specific autonomous region (Silber and Little 1996, 96). After clandestine rearming, Tudjman resisted Defense Minister Spegelj's proposal to attack Croatian Serb de facto statelets preemptively. After June 1991 declaration of independence, during brief fighting in Slovenia, again rejected Spegelj's plan to launch a preemptive encirclement of JNA bases in Croatia, on grounds that it would be "political suicide for democratic Croatia," largely because of expected international condemnation (Silber and Little 1996, 109). Repeatedly emphasized need to cultivate international support, which could be mobilized to counteract Serbia's initial political and military advantage (Gow, 15 May 1992, 17; Moore, 6 September 1991, 32; Moore, 11 September 1991, 38; Moore, 20 December 1991, 34). Before Bosnia war, may have sought to append Croat-controlled regions of Bosnia to Croatia, for example in meetings with Milošević (Andrejevich, 12 April 1991, 29-30). But also stated that Bosnia's borders would remain unchanged (Andrejevich, 28 June 1991, 36); and at times supported the concept of cantonizing Bosnia while maintaining its external borders (Bićanić and Dominis, 18 September 1992, 25). Responding to Milošević's argument that Serbia would seek to absorb large Serb populations outside Serbia in the event of Yugoslavia's break-up, Tudjman sought to deter him with a reciprocal claim, which potentially applied to parts of Vojvodina as well as to parts of Bosnia: "By the same token, we Croats have a right to

	demand that all Croats live in the same state" (Andrejevich, 15 March 1991, 28). Aspired to maximum control over Bosnian Croat regions, but also did not adopt an uncompromising position, especially on territorial sovereignty, as he did toward Croatia proper. (For general discussions, see Burg and Shoup 1999, 102-4; Goldstein 1999, 204-6, 210-22; Silber and Little 1996, 82-91, 105-17; Tanner 2001, 221-60.)
2) *Actions* indicating the *nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment.	*Unilaterally declared and seized independence in June 1991, predictably triggering Serbian invasion to support Croatian Serbs (Andrejevich, Moore and Perry, 12 July 1991; Andrejevich, 16 August 1991).* Agreed to cease-fire in November 1991, signed January 1992, that left large parts of Croatia in Croatian Serb hands. Tudjman's opponents in the August 1992 presidential election all criticized this concession. Tudjman's decision was a recognition of the need for time to build strength, rather than a commitment to accept the outcome, but it might have been indefinite (Bićanić and Dominis, 18 September 1992, 23-4). Although Croatian Serbs and Serbian paramilitaries initiated use of terror and ethnic cleansing and conducted it on a larger scale, persistent local pressure and violence cleansed Croatian Serbs from Croatian Army-controlled zones of fighting. Orthodox churches were often destroyed. There was little evidence of central government effort to protect Croatian Serb civilians. Opposition media in Croatia were harassed, but no violence was used against Croat civilians. Democratic process in Croatia was preserved. Commitment to internal democracy qualified by some harassment of opposition, backtracking on democratic norms (Sućić, 7 February 1997, 35-7). But no violence against Croatian political opponents. Force used only to dismantle unofficial HOS militia of Paraga (Gow, 15 May 1992, 19; Tanner 2001, 261-7). Sought to append Croat-controlled regions of Bosnia to Croatia. In Bosnia, initial cooperation between Tudjman and Izetbegović was formalized in July 1992. November 1991 declaration of separate Herceg-Bosna signaled ascendance of interests of regionally dominant Herzegovina Croats over the dispersed Croat communities of Central Bosnia. During fighting with Bosnian Muslims in 1993-94, both sides engaged in ethnic cleansing to solidify control of contested territories— though the conflict and cleansing process was initiated by the Muslims' central Bosnia offensive in early 1993 (Moore, 13 August 1993, 20; Shrader 2003, 70-162). Occasional killings of civilians also occurred (Moore, 7

	January 1994; Shrader 2003). International pressure (sanction threats) led Tudjman to agree to joint Federation with Bosnian Muslims in exchange for diplomatic and military support from U.S. (February 1994 Washington Agreement). This showed Tudjman making Croatia's territorial integrity and international standing a higher priority than the goals of the Herzegovina Croats (Moore, 28 May 1993; Moore, 1 April 1994; Moore, 30 January 1995, 26-7). Tudjman showed a general though grudging willingness to compromise, except on issues—such as independence—deemed fundamental and attainable. "Z4 Plan" to exchange Croatian Serb autonomy for Croatian sovereignty accepted by Milosević and with reservations by Tudjman, but rejected by Croatian Serbs (Tanner 2001, 282-95). As military tide turned and Croatian Serbs started to cave in diplomatically, Tudjman rushed the final offensive that quickly overran the Croatian Serb zones (except for eastern Slavonia). Although Tudjman proclaimed that the Croatian Serb population could stay, there was never any question of this. After they fled the military assault, their villages were widely looted and burned. The Dayton Agreement was an outright victory on all of Croatia's territory, and a de facto victory in Bosnia. Nevertheless, the absence of de jure Bosnian Croat autonomy represented a real and lasting concession. (For general discussions, see Burg and Shoup 1999, 292-8; Goldstein 1999, 239-74.)
3) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning *other political goals or in personal life*.	Other priorities, such as political and personal freedoms, and economic reforms, were viewed more pragmatically rather than ideologically, and sometimes compromised to serve nationalist goals. For example, macroeconomic stabilization and microeconomic market reforms were delayed to finance the war effort, but remained a priority for Tudjman (Bićanić, 12 November 1993, 38; Bićanić, 21 January 1994, 41-2).
4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict.	Tudjman showed a tendency to make strong (if not extreme) ideological commitments throughout life— initially to Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). Fought as a partisan, became a YPA general at 38, and gravitated to ideological work. "He was ambitious and hard-working, and his historical texts were primarily those of a politician who wanted to adapt the interpretation of history to suit his political goals." Fired during suppression of Croatian Spring, he developed "a kind of Croatian national programme" (Andrejevich, 23 February 1990, 28-9; Goldstein 1999, 204-6, 303-4).

5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations.	The HDZ included all types from far-right to center, with Tudjman functioning as the unifying force. Some of these leaders later became political rivals, though mainly after leaving the HDZ out of frustration. Significant if not total commitment to internal party democracy and statewide democracy helped generate many leaders with broadly similar preferences. Tudjman always sought to preserve an ideologically broad party—preventing either the right-wing or the left-wing from becoming dominant (Moore, 22 April 1994; Moore, 3 June 1994).
Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:	
1) Consistency of stated goals; and consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record before and after the period of potential conflict.	Fought as a partisan and rose to rank of general before joining Croatian Spring nationalist movement. Thereafter remained solidly committed to the nationalist cause. Croatian Serb SDS leader Rasković "accused the HDZ of harboring Ustashe sympathizers, but admired Tudjman personally as an honest politician. 'He is a tough politician of clear conceptions who represents what most Croats accept. Tudjman is the kind of character who speaks quite openly about his intentions, and we like that…" (Tanner 2001, 224) Had a reputation for political openness and consistency (Tanner 2001, 293; Silber and Little 1996, 83-4).
2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	Fought as a partisan during World War II. For dissident activity, sentenced to two years (served one) in prison during Croatian Spring, and again for three years in 1981. From 1989, was willing to risk confrontation and either arrest or war; risk to personal position and freedom greater than risk to life. Did not seek to create an authoritarian regime; left a party that ceded power after losing elections, and later returned to power in elections. (For summaries, see Andrejevich, 23 February 1990, 28-9; Goldstein 1999, 204-6; Tanner 2001, 201, 205).
3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	Fought as a partisan during World War II. Gravitated to ideological activity his whole adult life, first in YPA and later as a nationalist dissident. Significant corruption among HDZ elites used to solidify party control and personal influence. But a more pronounced bias was toward maintaining state control of many large enterprises, which preserved political patronage in the hands of the government (Bićanić, 25 June 1993; Bićanić, 12 November 1993, 32). No evidence of personal corruption, but some nepotism.
4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders.	Many leaders of both types active in HDZ. A number of prominent HDZ members became critical of Tudjman and defected to join or form other parties (Moore, 22 April

	1994; Moore, 3 June 1994; Moore, 30 January 1995, 27-8).

Categorization: strongly principled (1), strong nationalist (4) in the Serbia dyad; but an ordinary nationalist (3) vis-à-vis Bosnia, with the Bosnian Croat regions a lower priority both in statements and actions.

Rationale: Evidence on ideological commitment to nationalist cause uniform and strong. Stated will to go to war for independence, with high costs but also high probability of success to be expected. Careful to plan onset and conduct of war in manner that didn't jeopardize objectives. On one hand, before war, failed to reassure Croatian Serbs about their future status, and refused any significant autonomy or official status compromise with Croatian Serbs. On other hand, agreed to cease-fire leaving large Croatian territories in Serb hands in late 1991; and compromised in setting up Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation to avoid sanctions and gain support for restoring control over all of Croatia's territory. Clearly not an extreme nationalist (5). Failure to consider more significant compromises before or during war indicates that he was more than an ordinary nationalist (3) vis-à-vis Serbia and the Croatian Serbs. Showed much more flexibility and will to compromise over Bosnian Croat regions. Consistent with this, he sought to maintain strong internal control of HDZ and imposed only limited restrictions on opposition press freedoms and opposition political power, while presiding over a catch-all party encompassing many political notables (including potential rivals) amid a well-functioning democratic political system.

Table A2. Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Bosnian Muslims

Indicator	Executive Leadership: Alija Izetbegović
Moderate vs. Extreme Nationalist Dimension:	
1) *Statements* indicating *the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs.	Committed to long-term goal of making Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) the titular nation-state of Bosnian Muslims, including a vague political role for Islam (Andrejevich, 7 December 1990, 23-4). In short-run, acknowledged that this is not possible until Muslims constitute either 50% of the population (*Islamic Declaration*), or 70% of the population (Silber and Little 1996, 208). At same time, agreed with secular-nationalist faction that Bosnia should retain all of its territory and be administered as a centralized state. Embraced religious-nationalist identity, rather than secular-nationalist Muslim identity or pan-ethnic territorial-cultural identity. According to Mahmutćehajić, Izetbegović's statements in the *Islamic Declaration* about how Islam could not peacefully coexist with non-Islamic institutions, and his rejection of state secularism, "robbed of legitimacy" those Muslims advocating multi-ethnic Bosniak identity. "When this statement of Izetbegovic's is cited in the political arena, Bosniak policy—reasonably enough—cannot but appear to be a danger threatening all" (Mahmutćehajić 2000, 43-4). In advance of war, Izetbegović stated repeatedly that war would be preferable to remaining within Serbia-dominated rump Yugoslavia, even if "submission" would be for "15

years" (Burg and Shoup 1999, 77); but at same time he minimized the likely cost, despite a highly adverse balance of power, given minority status with Bosnia, near-certain support of Serbia and Croatia for their ethnic kin, encirclement with no outlet to the sea, and little expectation of active external support. Did not recognize collective goals of Serbs and Croats, but only their individual rights. Although insisted on war if necessary, did not seem to undertake any serious planning or preparation, which seems to have been organized, largely independently, by others. In the 1990 electoral campaign, took a deliberately vague position on Bosnia's status within Yugoslavia: "The PDA [Party of Democratic Action—primary Bosnian Muslim political party] envisages a federation with many confederal elements or a confederation with many federal elements" (Andrejevich, 18 January 1991, 31). After the election, he adopted the position of Slovenia and Croatia, that Yugoslavia should become a confederation of sovereign states (Andrejevich, 5 July 1991, 29-30). In parliamentary debate before declaring sovereignty, stated that "there will not be war" and "sleep peacefully" (Burg and Shoup 1999, 77, 78), and at the same time, "the Muslims will defend themselves with great determination and survive" (Silber and Little 1996, 215). Izetbegović emphasized multi-ethnic Bosniak identity in contacts with West, but emphasized Muslims as titular people in contacts with Islamic world. In December 1993, Izetbegović spoke out against "common life" of the three ethnicities (quote from Burg and Shoup 1999, 194-7). (For general discussions, see Burg and Shoup 1999, 46-7, 58-60, 66-8, 71-3, 77-8, 105-7, 108-16, 120-7, 194-7; Mahmutćehajić 2000, 43-4; Silber and Little 1996, 27, 211, 213-4, 217, 219.)

| 2) *Actions* indicating the *nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment. | *Although didn't initiate fighting, declaration of independence was the key step in precipitating fighting. Insisted on fighting rather than accepting either de jure partition or de facto partition via regional federalization.* Once war underway, long tolerated tremendous costs rather than compromise, but ultimately proved willing to compromise at Dayton. He showed a pattern of appearing to compromise and then drawing back, from prewar Cutleiro negotiations through late-war Tudjman-Milosevic negotiations (Andrejevich, 8 October 1993, 17). Did not use violence against Muslim political rivals except where they actively rebelled—as did Fikret Abdić (Andrejevich, 8 October 1993). Did not initiate ethnic cleansing in conflict with Serbia and Serbs, but reciprocated it on a large scale— |

	mainly by saying and doing nothing while local commanders did it. Risked further disaster by initiating secondary conflict with Croatia for exclusive control of central Bosnia, during which Muslim forces initiated ethnic cleansing of Croats (Moore, 13 August 1993, 20; Shrader 2003, 70-162). Except in some multi-ethnic urban centers such as Sarajevo and Tuzla, ethnic cleansing seems to have been done everywhere where it was feasible. Didn't use terrorism as a state policy, but again, didn't actively preempt local commanders from using it except after long delays and negative publicity. Examples were organized criminal-led gangs in Sarajevo (for a year and a half) and foreign militants (Moore, 7 January 1994, 116). (For general discussions, see Burg and Shoup 1999, 66-8, 105-7, 137-9, 171-81, 194-7, 269-81, 317-62; Mahmutćehajić 2000, 46-9, 52-5.)
3) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning *other political goals or in personal life*.	Committed to pan-Islamic political unity (Burg and Shoup 1999, 66-8). Emphasis on Muslim religious identity in education and cultural policies (Mahmutćehajić 2000, 87).
4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict.	As young man, during World War II, member of religious-nationalist Muslim Youth. In SFRY, early declaration of support for pan-Islamic state across Muslim world. Such public statements and activities predictably led to his imprisonment (Burg and Shoup 1999, 58-60).
5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations.	Within the ideologically diverse Bosnian Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA), frequently alleged to be "autocratic," but also regarded as one able to "reconcile the hawks with the doves" (*Delo*, 20 December 1990, quoted by Andrejevich, 18 January 1991, 31); encouraged leaders that shared his strong religious-nationalist beliefs, but tolerated secular Muslim nationalists and those committed to multi-ethnic Bosniak identity. Examples are Zulfikarpašić and Silajdžić. Those that disagreed too much—e.g., over seeking prewar compromise with Serbs (Zulfikarpašić)—sooner or later ended up leaving the SDA and starting new parties (Andrejevich, 7 December 1990, 24-5; Burg and Shoup 1999, 66-8, 71-3; Cabaravdić, 3 November 1995; Cabaravdić, 12 July 1996; Zulfikarpašić 1998).
Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:	
1) Consistency of stated goals; and consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record before and after the period of potential conflict.	For many decades, remained committed to long-term goal of Bosnia as titular state of Bosnian Muslims, defined religiously as well as ethnically (Burg and Shoup 1999, 46-7).

2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	During World War II, member of Young Muslims nationalist youth movement with ties to Ustashe (Croatian fascist) youth movement, but did not fight in the Ustashe-Partisan war. Was imprisoned in 1946 for Young Muslims membership. Imprisoned again in 1983 for advocating pan-Muslim religious nationalism that directly challenged incumbent Yugoslav system. From 1989, was willing to risk confrontation and either arrest or war; there was a risk to life as well as to personal position and freedom. Briefly seized and imprisoned by Bosnian Serb forces at Sarajevo Airport in May 1992 (Burg and Shoup 1999, 66-8; Andrejevich, 7 December 1990, 23; Andrejevich, 18 January 1991, 31).
3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	No evidence of personal corruption. Tolerated corruption or criminality among subordinates insofar as this seemed necessary to pursue his goals (Burg and Shoup 1999, 66-8). "Lack of transparency in use of funds," but apparently in service of religious-nationalist goals (Mahmutćehajić 2000, 87).
4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders.	High-profile SDA leaders were generally principled. Sought to promote fellow leaders sharing his ideological beliefs. (Burg and Shoup 1999, 66-8)

Categorization: strongly principled (1), strong nationalist (4), in both the Serbia and Croatia dyads.

Rationale: Far-reaching religious-nationalist identity with titular national and substantively Islamic political goals, combined with repeatedly stated will to risk war under highly adverse conditions indicates at least strong nationalist. Prior to declaring independence, repeatedly stated will to go to war under prevailing circumstances. Treatment of other ethnic groups and own-group political organization indicates not an extreme nationalist. Also corroborated by ultimate willingness to compromise at Dayton. All evidence indicates purely principled. Tolerance of corruption seems intended instrumentally to consolidate and maintain personal political control so as to safeguard pursuit of objectives.

Table A3. Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Serbia

Indicator	Executive Leadership: Slobodan Milošević
Moderate vs. Extreme Nationalist Dimension:	
1) *Statements* indicating *the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed	Initially sought Serbia-centered recentralization of power in Yugoslavia; but also declared that, if Slovenia, Croatia and other Republics seceded, would support secession of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs rather than fight to preserve a unified Yugoslavia (Andrejevich, 20 July 1990, 40; Andrejevich, 14 September 1990, 39-40; Andrejevich, 22 February 1991, 40; Andrejevich, 28 June 1991, 36). Milošević stated that, "the [current] borders between

compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs.	Republics in Yugoslavia will never become state borders" (Moore, 20 September 1991, 38). After crushing Albanian protests following reimposition of Serbian control in Kosovo, spoke of using force if necessary to defend Serb interests in Yugoslavia (Judah 2008, 68). Support for cultural but not political autonomy for Kosovo Albanians (although cultural autonomy was sharply restricted in practice, for example in education). In run-ups to wars in Croatia and Bosnia, supported local Serb efforts to acquire arms, consolidate local power, and set up de facto statelets. Appeared to negotiate on partition of Bosnia with Croatia, including possible Muslim "buffer state." Criticized Slovenian and Croatian moves toward independence, but responded by supporting an expanded Serbian state that would encompass the large Serb communities in Croatia and Bosnia. Made some statements in support of Serb interests in Macedonia, but didn't show any significant interest in imposing Serbian control. (For general discussions, see Burg and Shoup 1999, 102-4, 191-4; Silber and Little 1996, 70-81, 95-104, 113-4, 119-46; Tanner 2001, 242-3)
2) *Actions* indicating the *nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment.	*Seized power in Kosovo in 1989, but was not resisted by Kosovo Albanians (Andrejevich, 5 January 1990, 34; Andrejevich, 2 March 1990, 40-1; Andrejevich, 27 July 1990, 48-9). Accepted secession of Slovenia as means of gaining control over Yugoslav presidency, state, and especially JNA (Andrejevich, 6 September 1991, 32). Subsequently negotiated secession of Macedonia. Initiation of war, terrorism, and ethnic cleansing in Croatia war (Andrejevich, 16 August 1991; Gow, 15 May 1992, 19-20; Moore, 3 January 1992, 70-1; Shoup, 13 December 1991). Similar initiation of war, terrorism, and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia (Hayden, 28 May 1993, 8-9).* Croatia war onset and strategy led to shift of international (especially European) approach from emphasizing territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, to declaring Yugoslavia "dissolved" and recognizing any Republics that seceded through a democratic process (Moore, 6 September 1991, 34-5; Moore, 20 December 1991). Bosnia war onset and strategy led to international economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro alone (Dyker and Bojić, 21 May 1993). Terror and ethnic cleansing also conducted on a larger scale and more systematically, as compared with rivals. Many of the worst atrocities were committed by paramilitaries informally supported from Serbia proper and also used as internal political enforcers. Despite objections by Panić,

	said and did nothing to stop paramilitaries' near-complete ethnic cleansing of Croats from Vojvodina. In general, little effort to protect status even of non-Albanian internal minorities. No commitment to democracy in Serbia, with political enemies targeted for harassment, beatings, and sometimes killings; disloyal official fired, elections regularly manipulated (Andrejevich, 26 March 1993, 23; Markotich, 30 January 1995, 58-9; Markotich, 27 December 1996). Milošević was careful to impose control over YPA and Serbian paramilitaries, but unlike Tudjman, not so directly over his Serb proxies in Croatia and Bosnia. Showed a greater concern for control in Serbia than for control over strategic objectives in Croatia and Bosnia wars (Gow, 15 May 1992). Independent mass media almost entirely suppressed. Milošević always seemed weakly committed to specific Greater Serbia goals (Gow, 15 May 1992, 20). From 1994, Milošević applied increasing pressure on Bosnian Serbs to make concessions, foreshadowing his negotiations and agreement at Dayton, which later imposed a settlement (Gow, 7 January 1994, 133; Markotich, 11 August 1994; Moore, 30 January 1995, 24-5; Markotich, 30 January 1995, 56-8). Late 1995 Croatian and Bosnian Croat-Muslim offensives were not resisted by Milošević, including "Z4 Plan" for autonomy in Croatian Serb regions (Burg and Shoup 1999, 171-81, 306-11, 331-7; Goldstein 1999, 226-38; Tanner 2001, 278-9). Use of force to achieve nationalist goals in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia was feasible, given collapse of all-Yugoslav institutions, significant relative military, economic and demographic strength, not only against much weaker Kosovo Albanians and Bosnian Muslims, but also against stronger Croatia. But initiation of war in Croatia and Bosnia, and initiation and more extensive use of terrorism and ethnic cleansing in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, led to repeated international intervention that tipped military balance against Serbia. While strategies of conflict may have been useful in taking and keeping internal political power, they were a foreseeable disaster for Serbian and Serb national interests—particularly after the first Croatia war, by late 1991. In Dayton Agreements, formally accepted defeat in Croatia, and severe setback in Bosnia.
3) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning *other political goals or in personal life*.	Campaigned for leadership of Serbian nationalist movement in 1987, despite lack of any previous commitment to the cause. Claimed simultaneous commitment to socialist principles, especially through his wife's political activities. But routinely violated socialist

	principles in economic policymaking as well as in nationalities policies. Intervention in support of Montenegrin political allies, from January 1989, advanced short-term goal of gaining voting or blocking power in Yugoslav collective presidency (Andrejevich, 5 January 1990, 34). But the potential long-term consequence of alienating Montenegrin public from Serbia was largely ignored, contributing to Montenegro's ultimate secession from Federal Yugoslavia (Andrejevich, 22 November 1991). Little evidence of consistent commitment to any substantive principles.
4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict.	Little evidence of strong ideological commitment in early life and career. Before making bid for control of Serbia, was an "anonymous, great apparatchik" advanced by his patron Stambolić (Judah 2008, 64-8). In a long career as an LC functionary, rose quietly to a high position within the Serbian LC by 1986. After 1997, when Kosovo Liberation Army-led attacks and decentralized fighting commenced, ethnic cleansing and large-scale refugee flows twice prompted international intervention—the second time including bombing and invasion preparations that led to loss of Kosovo (Judah 2008, 75-102). Acquiesced in 1999 Kosovo defeat by withdrawing, albeit without formal acceptance. Concessions occurred only when threat of military defeat became imminent.
5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations.	Unlike the situations in Slovenia and Croatia, "Serbian dissidents, especially left-oriented and nationalist intellectuals, were assigned a relatively insignificant role…" (Andrejevich, 20 July 1990, 41). Did not support leaders of stature within Serbian Socialist Party—rather eliminated or marginalized them where they existed or emerged, as occurred with Ćosić and Panić. Same approach taken to non-Party allies such as Šešelj (Andrejevich, 26 March 1993; Gow, 7 January 1994, 127-9; Markotich, 22 April 1994). Delayed democratic opening longer than in other Yugoslav Republics (Andrejevich, 20 July 2990, 40). No commitment to internal party and general democracy; rather, used violence and other state powers extensively to prevent political rivals from emerging or consolidating.
Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:	
1) Consistency of stated goals; and consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record before and after the period of potential conflict.	Having hitherto shown little interest in Serbian nationalism in prior career as banker and party cadre and reliable loyalist of Yugoslav communism, Milošević used April 1987 Kosovo Polje speech to assume leadership of Serbian nationalist movement—following which he immediately purged Stambolić and other rivals from Serbian LC and

	state. (Goldstein 1999, 202-4; Silber and Little 1996, 31-47). Avoided limelight and was by every indication a reliable communist, until made bid for control of Serbia by "playing nationalist card" (Judah 2008, 65). Prewar move of Socialist Party (reformed Serbian LC) away from relations with Yugoslav LC also contradicted Milošević's appeal for unity of the LC Yugoslavia (Andrejevich, 20 July 1990). Before and in early stages of wars, took strong nationalist positions; but as political and military conditions deteriorated, struck more compromising, ordinary nationalist poses. Rhetoric also varied dramatically in run-up to elections, apparently depending on Milošević's perception of the Serbian public's mood (Andrejevich, 21 December 1990, 33, 35-6). Used mass mobilizing methods to take power in Serbia; but restricted their use by the Serbian political opposition (Andrejevich, 20 July 1990, 42). (For a general discussion, see Đukić 2001.)
2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	From 1987, never took actions that threatened his personal power in order to pursue proclaimed ideological goals. Rather, pursued or retreated from confrontation in manner that seemed calculated to solidify power.
3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	No evidence of personal corruption, but evidence of nepotism. Proclaimed support for democratization and market reform, but systematically qualified and undermined them in practice (Andrejevich, 3 August 1990, 42; Andrejevich, 29 March 1991). Massive corruption actively pursued in using state-dominated ownership and finance to build politically supportive patron-client network (Bićanić, 29 May 1992, 48; Dyker and Bojićić, 21 May 1993, 53; Minić, 27 August 1993).
4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders.	Massive corruption among peers or subordinates cultivated as means to retain power and achieve political goals (Bićanić, 29 May 1992, 48; Minić, 27 August 1993).

Categorization: Strongly power-seeking (3). Toward Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnian Muslims, veered back and forth between more uncompromising strong nationalism (4) before and sometimes during conflicts, to more compromising ordinary nationalism (3) when wars went badly and political legitimacy was weakened. Took non-nationalist (1) position toward Slovenia and Macedonia in face of early resistance to recentralization of LC power in Yugoslavia. Rationale: Little or no evidence of consistently principled behavior. Statements and actions in the Serbian nationalist cause became more or less extreme depending upon which seemed to deliver greater legitimacy and to minimize internal or external political threats. While consistent nationalist goals were stated from 1987, failed strategies were used repeatedly, apparently for short-term political advantage, regardless of the consequences for proclaimed nationalist goals. After political and military setbacks began to pose significant risks to political power, he showed little hesitation in accepting concessions and outcomes that were initially rejected out of hand. In the Dayton Agreements, he formally accepted defeat in Croatia, and a severe setback in Bosnia.

He acquiesced in the Kosovo defeat by withdrawing, albeit without formal acceptance. Concessions occurred only when military defeat was imminent—indicating myopic focus on political consequences rather than long-term emphasis on stated nationalist goals. Lack of consistent commitment to any substantive goals makes it implausible to categorize him even as moderately principled, e.g., in the manner of a "balanced" machine politician.

Table A4. Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Kosovo Albanians

Indicator	Executive Leadership: Ibrahim Rugova
Moderate vs. Extreme Nationalist Dimension:	
1) *Statements* indicating *the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs.	From 1989 Serbian abolition of Kosovo's autonomy, Rugova co-founded and led Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK), and created "shadow" political and public service institutions. Elected president in 1992. Committed to goals of making Kosovo an independent Republic within Yugoslavia, and an independent country or a union with Albania in the event of Yugoslavia's break-up; declared Kosovo a sovereign state in September 1991 (Andrejevich, 27 July 1990, 50; Andrejevich, 18 October 1991, 25, 27; Moore, 20 December 1991, 37). But use of force to achieve independence in the short run was judged extremely difficult and costly given Serbia's military advantage and Milošević's ruthlessness, so a non-violent resistance strategy was chosen (Andrejevich, 2 March 1990, 44-5; Andrejevich, 18 October 1991, 25, 28; Moore, 13 December 1991, 30). For example, rejected Tudjman's urging to open another front against Serbia. Without ready means of arming, fighting looked too dangerous, and the overwhelming majority of the population seemed to agree. In 1992, Rugova said, "We are not certain how strong the Serbian military presence in the province actually is, but we do know that it is overwhelming and that we have nothing to set against the tanks and other modern weaponry in Serbian hands….We would have no chance of successfully resisting the army. In fact the Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than to be massacred" (Judah 2008, 71). Support for cultural but not political or territorial autonomy for Kosovo Serbs. Showed general willingness to compromise, except on basic issue of Kosovo independence (Judah 2008, 69-74).
2) *Actions* indicating the *nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival	*No violence initiated against Serbian military or civilians by DLK in 1989-97 (thus in period 1990-1995).* Accepted Serbian rule indefinitely as long as adverse conditions to achieve independence at a reasonable cost existed. Commitment to internal democracy and political freedoms strong (Andrejevich, 2 March 1990, 44-5). No violence or

group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment.	harassment directed at Albanian political opponents.
3) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning *other political goals or in personal life*.	No evidence of extremism in service of any cause or principles.
4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict.	Born 1944. Father and grandfather executed by partisans as they assumed power. Before 1989, Rugova did not directly oppose the Yugoslav state, but pursued an academic and journalistic career with a broad emphasis on Albanian literary culture (Judah 2008, 69-74). In early career, despite quiet commitment to Albanian nationalist cause, no evidence of ideological extremism in nationalist or other causes. During war started from 1997 by rival Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), little effort to stop KLA from targeting Serb civilians, including KLA's retaliatory ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Serbs. After war ended in 1999, accepted de facto Serbian rule in Kosovo's Mitrovića region.
5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations.	Rugova supported many leaders of stature within the DLK, some of whom later became political rivals. Commitment to internal party and general democracy helped to yield many leaders with broadly similar preferences.
Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:	
1) Consistency of stated goals; and consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record before and after the period of potential conflict.	Since 1989, Rugova consistently pursued independence, along with non-violent strategies reasonably calculated to achieve it. Similar points hold for other policy goals. Before 1987, took no high-profile public ideological positions, apparently in response to restrictions of Yugoslav communism.
2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	Born in 1944, so no opportunity to fight during World War II. Did not directly challenge incumbent Yugoslav system until Milošević's rise in Serbia. From 1989, showed will to risk political confrontation and either arrest or violent retribution; risk was to life as well as to personal position and freedom. Arrested and jailed by Serbia during late 1990s war.
3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes	No evidence of personal corruption. Some corruption tolerated in effort to build politically supportive patron-client network.

nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	
4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders.	Some corruption among peers or subordinates tolerated as means to retain power and achieve political goals.

Categorization: strongly principled (1), ordinary nationalist (3) toward Serbia.

Rationale: All evidence indicates strongly principled behavior. Strength of stated commitment to independence goal, under adverse relative power conditions and in face of a determined Serbian rival, made him more than a moderate nationalist (2); care to try to limit costs in face of adverse balance of power, but also general openness of DLK and non-violence toward Kosovo Serbs, made him less than a strong nationalist (4). For as long as there was no opportunity to achieve independence at a reasonable cost, acquiesced in Serbian rule indefinitely.

Table A5. Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Slovenia

Indicator	Executive Leadership: Milan Kučan (Slovenian LC Leader, 1986-1990, President, 1990-2002), "cohabitating" (GC, 156) with Lojze Peterle (Prime Minister, 1990-1992)
	Moderate vs. Extreme Nationalist Dimension:
1) *Statements* indicating *the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs.	Through the April 1990 elections, LC leader Kučan resisted efforts by Serbia and the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) to recentralize power, while advocating further decentralization of power to the point of de facto independence (Andrejevich, 23 February 1990, 35; Andrejevich, 2 March 1990, 37, 39; Andrejevich, 30 March 1990, 36-7). "The Yugoslav Socialist Alliance daily *Borba* stated that, 'Over one-half of the voters who opted for the communist candidate [Kučan, in the April 1990 election] are neither members nor sympathizers of his party'"; and "Slovenes view Kučan 'as the greatest protector of Slovene interests and the founder of Slovene statehood.'" (*Borba* quoted in Andrejevich, 27 April 1990, 36.) From April 1990 election, new Prime Minister Peterle, heading the center-right coalition "Demos" government, pursued independence peacefully, but with a declared will and rising capability to use force to take and defend it (Andrejevich, 27 July 1990, 45): "…if negotiations with the rest of Yugoslavia do not succeed, Slovenia will become an independent state." (Andrejevich, 29 June 1990, 48). Kučan reiterated the same position (Andrejevich, 18 January 1991, 30; Andrejevich, 15 March 1991, 26-7). Kučan was elected president in 1990 and again in 1992, and closely cooperated in formulating and advancing Peterle's policies (Andrejevich, 2 November 1990, 28-31; Gow and Carmichael 2000, 156-7, 177, 183; Rupel 1994, 190-4). Use

	of force to achieve independence was not expected to be that difficult, given collapse of all-Yugoslav institutions, lack of Serbian interest in Slovenian territory, and high Slovenian state capacity. No significant internal minorities or cross-border ethnic kin, hence no opportunity to observe statements or actions toward rival groups.
2) *Actions* indicating the *nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment.	*Following June 1991 declaration of independence, Peterle's government used force to secure exclusive control of Slovenia's territory (Andrejevich, Moore and Perry, 12 July 1991).* During brief skirmishes before Milošević pulled backed YPA, no change to goals and norms of pre-war period. Commitment to internal democracy, with no use of force against other Slovenians. Before initial 1990 elections, Kučan's Slovenian LC initially condemned but tolerated nationalist dissent, and defended freedom of nationalist-leaning press, while fending off pressure from YPA. But after YPA arrests of dissident journalists galvanized Committee for Defense of Human Rights (CDHR) and Slovenian nationalist opposition, Kučan and the Slovenian LC shifted toward strong support for press and political freedoms (Silber and Little 1996, 48-57). Peterle's coalition government always showed similar tolerance, completing political liberalization process after coming to power.
3) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning *other political goals or in personal life*.	General willingness to compromise, except on a few issues—such as independence—deemed fundamental. Democracy coupled with parliamentary system and divided institutional power also predisposed to moderation. But these institutions were chosen largely due to Kučan's influence, and were refined under Peterle's government (Andrejevich, 20 April 1990, 32-4).
4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict.	Leaders were mostly political outsiders (like Peterle) or reformed, formerly moderate LC communists (like Kučan). In Kučan's early LC career, he was viewed as a "party liberal," who was at the same time diplomatic enough to survive the 1972 intra-party purge (Andrejevich, 20 April 1990, 35). Little evidence of extremism among Slovenian elites (Andrejevich, 20 April 1990, 37).
5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations.	Previous reformism of Slovenian LC and development of democracy (dubbed the "Slovenian Spring")—again largely presided over by Kučan—helped to yield a remarkable crop of prominent, capable leaders with broadly similar, moderate or ordinary nationalist preferences (Andrejevich, 20 April 1990; Andrejevich, 4 May 1990).
Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:	
1) Consistency of stated goals; and	Since late 1980s, Slovene LC leader Kučan, along with

consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record before and after the period of potential conflict.	Peterle and other Demos leaders, consistently pursued independence, along with strategies reasonably calculated to achieve it (Andrejevich, 23 February 1990, 35; Andrejevich, 2 March 1990, 37, 39; Andrejevich, 30 March 1990, 36-7). Similar points hold for other policy goals. Kučan's stated ideological views showed a marked tendency to evolve as Slovene public opinion mobilized in favor of independence (Andrejevich, 20 April 1990). By contrast, Peterle's ideology was much more stable.
2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	Willingness to risk confrontation and either arrest or war; risk to personal position and freedom greater than risk to life. Kučan's Slovenian LC held the elections that were known to give the opposition a high probability of victory; then allowed transfer of power (Andrejevich, 27 April 1990). Same is true for Peterle and Demos coalition parties in later period.
3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	While Kučan was a career LC functionary, Peterle was a Catholic intellectual and technocrat. Under the old LC order, Peterle's early career choices could be expected to rule out a high political position in the future. Consistent principles and policymaking evident in other areas, such as political and economic reform. Peterle clung to ideological positions in other areas—particularly social policy—even as they increasingly hurt his popularity and undermined his coalition government (Gow and Carmichael 2000, 157-8). Little evidence of leadership corruption. Under communism, reputed to be the least corrupt Yugoslav Republic by far.
4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders.	Little corruption among peers or subordinates.

Note on "cohabitation" of Kučan and Peterle: Slovenia's form of government is parliamentary, so that the primary executive leader is the prime minister. The president is commander-in-chief. In practice, foreign and defense policy during the transition to independence was made by consensus. Both Kučan and Peterle, along with other members of the coalition government, were involved in decision-making (Gow and Carmichael 2000, 156-7, 177, 183; Rupel 1994, 190-4). Categorizations: Kučan, balanced (2), moderate nationalist (2); Peterle, strongly principled (3), ordinary nationalist (3).

Rationale: As commitment to resist Milošević and pursue greater Slovenian territorial self-determination showed, Kučan was closer to an ordinary nationalist (3) than to a non-nationalist (1). For Kučan, initial vagueness and flexibility about nationalist goals and reactive character of policy provides greater support for moderate nationalist (2) classification. Along with previous career path, also provides support for classifying Kučan as balanced (2) rather than purely principled (3). Peterle's nationalist ideology was more uncompromising, though still cautious. Strong ideological commitments—on both nationalist and other issues—are evident throughout Peterle's career.

Table A6. Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Macedonia

Indicator	Executive Leadership: Kiro Gligorov
	Moderate vs. Extreme Nationalist Dimension:
1) *Statements* indicating *the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs.	Gligorov was the Macedonian member of the eight-member Yugoslav collective presidency. In the 1987-91 crisis years, before Yugoslavia's break-up, he sought to preserve some kind of loose confederation—a compromise that would move toward even greater autonomy without forcing the conflict-prone decisions necessitated by a complete break-up into independent states (Andrejevich, 30 November 1990, 27; Andrejevich, 17 May 1991, 24). Emphasized commitment to negotiated reorganization of Yugoslavia into a looser confederation, and explicitly rejected "unilateral acts" such as Slovenia's and Croatia's June 1991 independence declarations (Andrejevich, 12 July 1991, 27). Gligorov "repeatedly played down any aims at outright independence, apparently viewing the break-up of the state as potentially fatal to Macedonian consciousness which was still a relatively new phenomenon" (Poulton 2000, 176; Engström 2009, 108). "In Macedonia also there was, and to some extent remains, a serious fear that with the presence of large ethnic Albanian regions in the north-west bordering Albania and Kosovo, Vardar Macedonia might be truncated with the ensuing rump falling prey to predatory neighbors who view the very concept of a Macedonian nation as historically false. Thus Gligorov was justifiably cautious, but he was swept along by events" (Poulton 2000, 176). Gligorov said, "Except for the Second World War when we fought against the fascist front…in all other uprisings or wars, we have always been the loser." And so Gligorov argued that the primary goal had to be to acquire independence without questioning existing borders and without violence—with the agreement of the rump Yugoslav authorities led by Milošević. (Liotta and Jeb 2004, 104-5) "While the Gligorov group pushed for Macedonia's independence within a new Yugoslav framework which would include a common army, currency, and foreign policy, VMRO-DPMNE [largest center-right opposition party] rejected this even before the elections and called for complete separation from Yugoslavia together with the establishment of an independent army" (Poulton 2000, 176). The indecisive December 1990 election produced a weak technocratic government, until a center-left coalition came to power, led by the reformed communist Macedonian LC—renamed the Social

	Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDUM). Gligorov was elected president in January 1991, and continued to exercise the primary leadership role—especially in negotiating independence (Andrejevich, 17 May 1991; Engström 2009, 117; Phillips 2004, 51; Liotta and Jeb 2004, 72, 106). "He forged a style of informal government by consensus using procedures that had no constitutional precedent" (Phillips 2004, 53). Gligorov and the SDUM retained the traditionally integrative aspirations of the Yugoslav LC toward ethnic minorities—in this case, particularly the Macedonian Albanians (Phillips 2004, 53).
2) *Actions* indicating the *nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment.	*Gligorov was later able to agree with Milošević and the JNA on withdrawal and Macedonia's independence.* "…the peaceful withdrawal of the JNA from Macedonia and the country's peaceful attainment of independence, the only such non-violent withdrawal in former Yugoslavia, must be counted a triumph for Gligorov's diplomacy" (Poulton 2000, 177). No violence was employed against either ethnic Macedonian or ethnic Albanian political rivals. From mid-1989, there was a strong commitment to internal democracy. The September 1991 referendum on independence was overwhelmingly supported by Macedonians, but boycotted by Albanians (Poulton 2000, 177). In response to political pressure from the Serb minority—only about 2.2% of the population in 1991—the Macedonian government agreed to add them as a co-official minority alongside the Albanians, Turks, and Vlachs, with rights including primary and secondary education in their language (Poulton 2000, 179-80, 182). The centrist, ethnic Albanian, Party of Democratic Prosperity was a (necessary) member of the coalition government from December 1990. Additional concessions were subsequently made on cultural and economic issues, such as university education in Albanian, and increased Albanian access to police and civil service jobs. Gligorov repeatedly defended such concessions, and argued that they were in the interests of Macedonians as well as Albanians. He said, "All this requires time, preparation, argumentation, patience" (Liotta and Jeb 2004, 70-1).
3) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning *other political goals or in personal life*.	Gligorov showed a general willingness to compromise—with Albanians, Serbs, and even on the goal of Macedonian independence. Following elections, democracy coupled with a parliamentary system and divided institutional power also predisposed to moderation. But Gligorov and the Macedonian LC were responsible for creating these institutions.

4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict.	Leaders were mostly former moderate communists. Gligorov was a longtime close associate of Tito, and a high-level party technocrat within the Yugoslav LC, elevated repeatedly to higher, more politically sensitive positions (Andrejevich, 17 May 1991, 23; Phillips 2004, 46-7).
5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations.	Previous reformism of Macedonian LC and development of democracy helped yield many prominent, capable leaders with broadly similar, relatively moderate nationalist preferences (Andrejevich, 30 November 1990).
Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:	
1) Consistency of stated goals; and consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record before and after the period of potential conflict.	Since mid-to-late 1980s, as the conflicts intensified among Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia, Gligorov and the Macedonian LC cautiously pursued greater autonomy, while avoiding a precipitous break with Yugoslavia out of fear of Serbia and its other neighbors. Consistently though cautiously supported democratization and market reform. Gligorov was widely viewed as a "father figure" (Phillips 2004, 47). At the same time, "Gligorov earned the nickname 'the fox' for his political acumen, insight, and diplomatic skills" (Liotta and Jeb, 103).
2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	Gligorov fought with the partisans during World War II; was blinded in one eye by a failed assassination attempt in 1995.
3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	Gligorov was a longtime close associate of Tito, and a high-level party technocrat within the Yugoslav LC, elevated repeatedly to higher, more politically sensitive positions (Phillips 2004, 46-7). Gligorov had a "clean" personal image. Patronage and corruption in the political process were widespread, but not unusual relative to other post-communist countries.
4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders.	No unusual corruption among peers or subordinates. Intra-party democracy associated with competition among strong, independent and relatively principled leaders (Andrejevich, 30 November 1990, 27).

Categorization: Gligorov, balanced (2), moderate nationalist (2).
Rationale: Gligorov's moderate nationalism was somewhat closer to ordinary nationalism than to non-nationalism. Even more than for Kučan, Gligorov's initial vagueness and flexibility about nationalist goals and the reactive character of his policies provides greater support for moderate nationalist classification. To some extent, this may have been due to more adverse balance of power conditions. Showed will to make significant concessions to reassure not just Serbs, but also other minorities, especially huge Albanian minority. Political openness provides similar evidence. Preferences gradually evolved over time to fit political conditions, but, at any given time, he also won broad public support—particularly among ethnic Macedonians—for his preferred approach. Among ethnic Macedonian public, strong reputation for being a judicious, pragmatic leader.

Table A7. Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Macedonian Albanians

Indicator	Executive Leadership: Nevzat Halili of Party for Democratic Prosperity, and in 1994-1995, also Arben Xhaferi of People's Democratic Party
	Moderate vs. Extreme Nationalist Dimension:
1) *Statements* indicating *the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs.	Initially dominant Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) sought greater local political autonomy through decentralization of municipal government (but not territorial autonomy), more equal legal recognition and political and civil service representation, and improved cultural rights and economic development within the existing political system (Andrejevich, 30 November 1990, 28). The smaller People's Democratic Party of Albania (PDA), which emerged under Xhaferi in 1994, though making greater demands, was also committed to operating within the existing political system. Yet, along with Macedonian Albanian public opinion, both parties identified strongly with the cross-border Kosovo Albanians and with Albania proper. The PDP was divided between factions seeking autonomy, links with Albania, and those "seeking a civic rather than an ethnic state of Macedonia" (Poulton 2000, 184). Initial PDP leader Halili (elected August 1990, replaced February 1994) "expressly denied this [affiliation with Rugova's DLK and desire for secession] and acknowledged the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Macedonia and Yugoslavia and the inviolability of Yugoslavia's borders, and confirmed commitment to its federal arrangement. Such statements, however, had to be seen in the light of the then situation of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, an oppressed minority able for the first time to operate openly and faced by authorities dominated by a hostile majority nationality which itself viewed the future with some alarm" (Poulton 2000, 134-5; also Andrejevich, 30 November 1990, 28-9). Halili maintained "good relations" with Gligorov. Educational grievances included lack of an Albanian-language university, and a fall in the number of Albanian-language secondary schools—although almost all received primary education in Albanian. There was continued disagreement over citizenship standards; over whether the constitution should be changed to be purely "civic," and if not, whether Albanians should receive greater official recognition. In general, Halili's stated ideal was not independence, but first autonomy, and later movement toward consociationalist-type arrangements (Liotta and Jeb

<table>
<tr><td></td><td>2004, 66-7; Poulton 2000, 184-91). In February 1994, the PDP was taken over by the more strongly nationalist leadership of Arben Xhaferi, which soon formed the new Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) (Phillips 2004, 68). "The DPA appears to be [in mid-to-late 90s] steadily eclipsing the PDP among young voters, especially in the crucial centers of Tetovo and Gostivar. But one must be careful not to over-stress the split between the PDP and the DPA; their essential difference was over tactics, with the PDP continuing to participate in coalition governments and the DPA tending to play the national card more and engage in confrontation and withdrawal….Xhaferi boycotted the parliament" (Poulton 2000, 197; also Liotta and Jeb 2004, 15-6). "Xhaferi has a tendency to equate the Macedonian Albanian situation to that of Kosovo, and to stress Albanian unity." In the run-up to the October 1998 elects, PDA goals were "…a bi-national Macedonian state; constitutional status for the Macedonian Albanians; a 'democracy of consensus' and mechanisms for decision-making on such consensus; the institution of an Albanian deputy head of state to supervise the fair operation of the state on ethnic matters; educational, cultural and other national institutions to affirm Albanian values in general; and the creation of an institution for regional development. On Kosovo he offered political and financial solidarity and, if the situation deteriorated, military involvement. Thus, while there are certainly strong parallels between the Kosovars and the Albanians in Macedonia, there are basic differences—most notably that the Kosovars' starting point is independence, while the Macedonian Albanians' is equal participation in a bi-national state….while the DPA seemed to be following the Kosovo route of non-participation, the PDP remained in government….If the possibility of the Kosovo Albanians co-existing in the same state as the Serbs seems virtually non-existent, the situation in Macedonia seems more hopeful although it is hard to overestimate the Albanians' desire for unity" (Poulton 2000, 198-9).</td></tr>
<tr><td>2) *Actions* indicating the *nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them*, in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end</td><td>*No PDP or DPA use of force to change the status quo within Macedonia.* Albanians started unofficial university and the Macedonian state later accepted it. Compromise was reached over issues such as increasing Albanian representation in police, courts and civil service. This was facilitated by PDP participation in the governing coalition with Gligorov's Social Democratic Union until October 1998, with five PDP cabinet ministers (Liotta and Jeb 2004, 67; Poulton 2000, 184-91). Operated peacefully within</td></tr>
</table>

violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment.	democratic system. Norms observed both toward Macedonians and Albanians.
3) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning *other political goals or in personal life*.	General willingness to compromise, including commitment to operating within the democratic system.
4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict.	Leaders were mostly political outsiders. Halili was an English teacher. Xhaferi was a journalist and film editor (Phillips 2004, 68-9). In summer 1997, the more strongly nationalist DPA raised Albanian flags alone over city halls, prompting polarizing clashes and trials. From December 1997, bombs were set off occasionally by the newly formed Macedonian KLA offshoot (Poulton 2000, 189-90; Phillips 2004, 69-72). As a result, the DPA called for a boycott of state institutions. In October 1998 elects, VRMO-DPMNE became the largest party, and the DPA surpassed PDP. But then DPA entered coalition government with VRMO-DPMNE, and amnesty for prisoners included those involved in the Albanian flag incidents. Yet inter-ethnic tensions and clashes continue to create a high risk of civil war. Huge Kosovo Albanian refugee flows in 1998-99 amounted to 10% of Macedonia's population and led to tensions over Macedonian government's efforts to control the inflow (Poulton 2000, 199-201; Phillips 2004, 72). (In 1999, there was significant spillover of KLA violence from Kosovo, leading to local fighting and stalemate, which marginalized both the PDP and DPA relative to the Macedonian KLA. Early NATO mediation and peacekeeping was probably necessary to prevent a civil war from developing and to broker a new political compromise. This compromise made some more concessions to Albanians, but did not qualitatively change the old status quo. This episode, including the emergence of new Macedonian Albanian leadership outside the PDP and DPA, is beyond the time-period addressed in this paper.)
5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations.	Development of democracy generated many prominent, capable leaders with broadly similar, relatively moderate or strong nationalist preferences. Xhaferi's emergence as a rival to Halili itself shows internal democracy of PDP.
Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:	
1) Consistency of stated goals; and consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record	Since political liberalization in the late 1980s, Albanian parties had a consistent record of seeking greater local autonomy and more equal representation and public services

before and after the period of potential conflict.	within the existing political system.
2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	Both Halili and Xhaferi showed a willingness to risk confrontation to pursue limited goals; risk to personal position and freedom greater than risk to life.
3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.	No unusual personal corruption. Political patronage and corruption were widespread, but not unusual relative to other post-communist countries.
4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders.	No unusual corruption among peers or subordinates.

Categorizations: Vis-à-vis Macedonia, Halili of the PDP was a strongly principled (3), moderate nationalist (2); Xhaferi of the DPA was a strongly principled (3), ordinary nationalist (3). Rationale: Neither PDP nor DPA demanded independence, and so fell short of what Rugova demanded in Kosovo. Both operated within the democratic system, although Xhaferi was willing to rely more on defiance, friction and stalemate to apply pressure for concessions. Both were in a less adverse balance of power situation than was Rugova. Given balance of power conditions, strong nationalists would not have committed themselves to this much restraint. For both leaders, consistency of principles, along with will to take personal and political risks in pursuit of them, indicates strongly principled.

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