Suggestions and reading questions (for readings in parts I-III)

Overall suggestions for the readings:

1. I suppose that my main suggestion would be this: Actually read everything that is assigned, and read each article or chapter multiple times. I know this can be difficult and time-consuming, but it’s essential for accomplishing what you need to accomplish for this course.

2. Having said that, be sure to read actively: Underline and write in the margins where necessary, and be thinking critically about the material. Even if you agree with what you are reading, be asking “Is that right?” “What reason is there for thinking that’s true?” and so on. Writing outlines and short summaries of the readings is quite helpful too.

3. Take your time. Some of the readings (and some parts of them) can be worked through quite quickly, but other readings (and parts of them) will require slowing down considerably. Ten pages per hour is probably about the maximum reading speed to aim for, and a slower pace would be even better.

4. The questions given below should help you out in knowing what to look for in the readings. For instance, if one of the reading questions asks you to state an argument that appears in that reading, then (1) look for that argument and (2) be able to state the entirety of that argument or at least what the overall argumentative move in that argument seems to be.

5. Look for jargon. As with the rest of philosophy and nearly every other discipline, there are lots of terms and names of views in metaphysics. It's a good idea to keep some kind of record of what those terms mean and what those named views hold.

6. As a final suggestion, do your best to see how the various readings fit together, both with the other readings for that topic of the course and also with other topics in the course.

General Outline and List of Readings for Topics I-III:

I. Preliminaries, Introduction to Metaphysics

Michael Jubien, “Metaphysics,” CM Ch. 1
Michael Loux, Preface to MCR
Peter Van Inwagen, “Objectivity”

II. Universals

Michael Loux, “The Problem of Universals”
Michael Jubien, “Platonism,” CM Ch. 3
Bertrand Russell, “The World of Universals”
David Armstrong, “Universals as Attributes”
W.V. Quine, “On What There Is”

III. Particulars

Michael Loux, “The Ontological Status of Concrete Particulars”
Max Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles"
James Van Cleve, “Three Versions of the Bundle Theory”
Michael Jubien, “Numbers,” CM Ch. 2
Keith Campbell, “The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars” (photocopy)

Detailed suggestions and questions for individual readings:

I. Preliminaries, Introduction to Metaphysics

Michael Jubien, “Metaphysics,” CM Ch. 1

Questions:
1. What is metaphysics?
2. How is metaphysics different from physics (and the other sciences)?
3. What are some different senses (or meanings) of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’? What is the right sense of that distinction for our purposes in metaphysics?
4. What is a concept?
5. What is a conceptual analysis?
6. What is the scope of metaphysics? What topics are of interest in metaphysics?

Michael Loux, Preface to MCR

This is a quick read, but make note of what to expect from the readings in this volume.

Questions:
1. What are the two main conceptions of metaphysics that Loux mentions? Which of those conceptions will we be following in our course?
2. What topics are of interest in metaphysics?

Peter Van Inwagen, “Objectivity”

I strongly encourage you to read this optional piece. Van Inwagen’s article is an excerpt from his book Metaphysics (and includes some references to other portions of that book), and is a criticism of Anti-Realism in its various forms. What Van Inwagen calls ‘The Common Western Metaphysic’ is the view we’ve been calling ‘Realism’, and he uses that name here too. Be sure to notice what Van Inwagen means by ‘objectivity’, and be sure to compare that to what Jubien had to say about objectivity (and subjectivity) in Ch. 1 of CM.

Questions:
1. What does Van Inwagen mean by ‘objective’?
2. What is the difference between idealism and Anti-Realism?
3. What is the Anti-Realist’s argument (as given by Van Inwagen) for the claim that Mount Everest’s being 8847.7 meters high is “a social construct”, and thus not a truth about mind-independent reality?
4. What is Van Inwagen’s argument against Anti-Realism?

II. Universals

Michael Loux, “The Problem of Universals”

Questions:
1. Give some general characterizations of what a universal is.
2. What are some examples of universals?
3. What is the difference between realism (with respect to universals) and nominalism?
4. Three arguments for realism about universals concern (1) attribute agreement, (2) sentences containing abstract terms, and (3) ordinary subject-predicate sentences. Be able to give at least an informal statement of each of those arguments.
5. List some objections nominalists have raised in opposition to realism.
6. What is austere nominalism?
7. What is a trope?

Michael Jubien, “Platonism,” CM Ch. 3

I almost had everyone read Ch. 2 of CM (entitled “Numbers”) first, as that chapter provides a good lead-in to marking out the different views of universals. That chapter is assigned for later, but I’d recommend reading it now if you have the time. Watch for an ambiguity with something from Loux’s piece from just above: Loux states that those who agree with Plato with respect to universals are realists. That’s right, but to be a platonist with respect to universals is to be one kind of realist about universals.

Questions:
1. Give a general characterization of what a property is, what a relation is, and what a proposition is.
2. Give a general characterization of the difference in meaning between ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’.
3. What considerations with respect to the use of ordinary language might be appealed to in support of platonism? Compare these considerations with the considerations in favor of realism as given by Loux in the previous reading.
4. Describe the view Jubien calls physicalism with respect to properties. What are the three versions of that view, and how does Jubien object to those views?
5. Describe the view called conceptualism with respect to properties. What objections does Jubien raise against that view?
6. Describe the view called nominalism with respect to properties. Describe the view Jubien calls linguistic nominalism with respect to properties.
7. According to Jubien, linguistic nominalists have to appeal to some notion of satisfaction in order to explain how sentences can be true and false (rather than appealing to property instantiation or exemplification). How might that notion be defined?
8. What problem does Jubien raise in objection to it?
9. What are sentences and other linguistic entities on a platonistic conception of them? on a conceptualist conception? on a nominalist conception?

Bertrand Russell, “The World of Universals”

Russell is a realist (and a platonist) about universals. Be sure to note Russell’s characterization of the various distinctions seen so far in this section of the course, along with his formulations of the various views we’ve considered so far (especially that of Plato himself).

Questions:
1. What is Russell’s argument that resemblance has to be a real universal?
2. What is Russell’s argument that the relation expressed by ‘is north of’ has to be a mind-independent entity?
3. How then does Russell argue that the relation expressed by ‘is north of’ is not a material thing?
4. What seems to be meant by Russell’s distinction between a thing existing and a thing subsisting?

David Armstrong, “Universals as Attributes”

This is a longer article (which is an excerpt from Armstrong’s Universals: An Opinionated Introduction), and there is a lot happening here. But the essay is a good account of the different views of universals, and first and foremost your goal should be to grasp the essence of those different views. Armstrong himself favors an Aristotelian view of universals, which is a view where universals are in some sense “in” their instances. Note here what Armstrong says is the motivation for saying that properties exist—it has to do with explaining cause-and-effect relations among things here in the physical world. Other items discussed in the essay (such as states of affairs, the resemblance relation, and higher-order types) should be noted, but for our purposes shouldn’t be agonized over.

Some clarifications:
1. Armstrong talks a bit here about what he calls the bundle theory, which is a view of particulars that says particulars are constituted entirely by universals. This is a view we will examine in more detail in our section on particulars, but don’t dwell on it in too much detail for right now. Armstong also covers some other material on particulars here too (e.g., in §§V-VI), and again, we will return to that topic later.
2. Also, Armstrong mentions trope theories on occasion, and we won’t consider that view in detail until the next section of the course. Again, don’t dwell on tropes for too long at this point.
3. Along the way, compare Armstong’s account of properties with the view that Jubien (in his Ch. 3) calls physicalism about properties.
4. Armstrong employs a distinction in some of the sections (e.g., §IX) that you may not have heard of before: the type-token distinction. It’s basically the universal-instance distinction. Our two cats are each tokens of the cat type. They’re also each tokens of the mammal type, and so on.
5. Don’t expend too much effort on §§IX and X.
5. There are some references in the text to other parts of Armstrong’s book. You may ignore any confusion that arises from those passages.

Questions:
1. What is the Principle of Instantiation?
2. What is meant by the Latin terms ‘ante res’, ‘in rebus’, and ‘post res’, and how might these terms be used to describe different views of universals?
3. What two arguments does Armstong consider in favor of platonism about universals?
4. What is a state of affairs, and what argument does Armstrong give for thinking they are real?
5. What is the Truthmaker Principle?
6. One objection to an in re account of universals is that properties wind up being entirely located in multiple places at once, and this seems contradictory. Figure out what Armstong’s answer to this problem seems to be (in §VIII), and see what you make of it.
7. What is the overall point of the discussion of resemblance (in §§X and XI) with respect to the debate over universals?
8. What is the problem Armstrong is talking about in §XII? What is his suggested solution?

W.V. Quine, “On What There Is”

You may find this to be a difficult article, but take your time. Quine is a nominalist of sorts. He insists in other works of his that he is a realist about universals, because he thinks that sets or classes of particulars exist—However, he is a realist in neither Plato’s nor Aristotle’s nor a conceptualist’s sense, for admitting sets of particulars into our ontology is all we need to do to explain everything universals are invoked to explain, Quine says. Quine talks a lot here about whether we should admit that various sorts of particulars are real, but think about his arguments in terms of the debate between realists and nominalists about universals here too.

Some clarifications:
1. Some of Quine’s discussion concerns what he calls “unactualized possibles”. Pegasus (the winged horse from Greek mythology) is one such candidate for being an unactualized possible: Pegasus doesn’t exist, but nevertheless could exist. We will return to such topics when we get to our section on modality (which includes the concepts of possibility and necessity) later in the course. Focus on the problem of universals for now—we’ll deal with modality later.
2. The discussion gets extremely complex at times, and in three places: (1) with respect to what’s called Russell’s theory of descriptions, (2) with respect to different views as to the nature of mathematical entities (like numbers), and (3) at the end. Do your best, and I’d suggest using your energy understanding (1) over (2) and (3), incidentally.

Questions:
1. What is “the riddle of nonbeing”?
2. Compare McX’s position on Pegasus with a conceptualist’s position on universals.
3. Compare Wyman’s position on Pegasus with a platonist’s position on universals (especially Russell’s).
4. Things get nasty starting on about p. 45 when Quine launches into a discussion of ontology and Russell’s theory of descriptions. There are three questions to keep in mind here: First of all, there is a general question concerning how we can ever legitimately say that such-and-such thing doesn’t exist. Second, there is the question of whether ordinary language (in cases of ordinary predication and in cases of abstract reference) tells us anything about what entities we should say are real. Third, there is the question of what view of universals we should accept. All three of these questions are in play with respect to Quine’s discussion of Russell here. (And never mind that Russell was a platonist about universals, and thus in opposition to Quine on that front—but Russell didn’t want to say that there are unactualized possibles, so they’re on the same team in that respect.)
5. How is metaphysics like doing science? (p. 53 and following)
6. The end sounds almost Anti-Realist in spirit. Is it?

III. Particulars

Michael Loux, “The Ontological Status of Concrete Particulars”

1. The two views to consider with respect to the nature of concrete particulars are (1) substratum theories and (2) bundle theories. Give a clear characterization of each.
2. What is the principle of the identity of indiscernibles?
3. What does that principle have to do with the dispute between substratum theorists and bundle theorists?
4. What line of argument might substratum theorists use to defend their view?
5. How might bundle theorists respond to that line of argument?

Max Black, “The Identity of Indiscernibles”

Some clarifications:
1. Black is arguing here that the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is false. His mouthpiece in this little dialogue is B (remember ‘B’ as short for ‘Black’), and a defender of the principle is A.
2. The theory of meaning known as the verificationist theory of meaning gets spoken of on occasion here. Verificationists about meaning hold that the meaning of a sentence is determined by its empirical verification conditions. Furthermore, if a sentence has no such empirical verification conditions (i.e., it is in principle impossible to empirically verify that the sentence is true), then that sentence is meaningless.

Questions:
1. What is A’s initial line of argument for the principle of the identity of indiscernibles? What are B’s replies?
2. What is A’s second line of argument for the principle?
3. In the remainder of the article, B gives a total of three candidate counterexamples to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Be able to describe each one, along with what A says is wrong with the first two.
4. Count how many times the two characters say something along the lines of “What do you mean by that?” and “To say ___ is just to say ___”. Consider whether their claims about translations and paraphrase are correct or not.

James Van Cleve, “Three Versions of the Bundle Theory”

Questions:
1. What are the objections Van Cleve considers to the bundle theory?
2. What are the first two versions of the bundle theory, and how do they fare against the objections?
3. What is the difference between what Van Cleve calls "the old bundle theory" and "the new bundle theory"?
4. How does the new bundle theory far against the objections?
5. What objection does Van Cleve raise against the new bundle theory?


Michael Jubien, “Numbers,” CM Ch. 2

Questions:
1. What is the argument for realism about numbers that appeals to the grammatical similarity between statements like 'Sue is shorter than Kate' and 'Seven is less than nine'?
2. Describe the three main views of numbers that Jubien describes: Platonism, conceptualism, and nominalism.
3. What objection to platonism (about numbers) does Jubien consider?
4. What is the objection to conceptualism that might be called "the problem of too many sevens"?
5. What other objections to conceptualism does Jubien consider?
6. What paraphrases do nominalists offer for statements like 'Seven is less than nine'?
7. How might nominalists address the issue of giving an account of properties like being seven-membered?

Keith Campbell, “The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars” (photocopy)

Questions:
1. What is a trope? Give some examples.
2. What is Campbell's argument (on pp. 351-2) for tropes being both abstract and particular?
3. What sort of theory of concrete particulars is available in terms of tropes?
4. What is the trope-theoretic answer to the so-called "problem of universals"?
5. What relation do trope theorists leave as a primitive relation?
6. How do trope theorists analyze change?