

PHIL 101 Test 2 Study Questions

Our second test is scheduled for Monday, February 23. Expect a test composed of 20 true/false questions and 20 multiple-choice questions. Any material covered from our last test through the class meeting of February 20 may appear on the test. Test 2's material includes not only material addressed explicitly in class, but also everything from the assigned readings. I'll very likely focus on what got addressed in class, but anything is fair game.

1. Know what is meant by the following terms, names of views, names of arguments etc.:

argument	the interaction problem/Elizabeth's question
premise	Ockham's razor
conclusion	logical behaviorism
counterexample	the identity theory
the mind-body problem	C-fibers
dualism	zombie
epiphenomenalism	mutant
parallelism	functionalism
pre-established harmony	multiple-realizability
materialism/physicalism	phenomenal character
idealism	intentionality
Cartesian dualism (or interactionist dualism)	

2. *Philosophy of mind*

- The mind-body problem
 - What is the mind-body problem?
 - What is the difference between the different options for resolving the mind-body problem?
 - Which view gives up what claim in the set of propositions that constitutes the problem?
- Dualism
 - What arguments are there in favor of dualism? What criticisms are there of those arguments?
 - Why think that dualism is false?
- Materialism
 - What are some advantages to being a materialist?
 - What are some arguments in favor of materialism?
- Materialist views of mental states
 - What's good about each of the three materialist views of mental states—logical behaviorism, the identity theory, and functionalism?
 - What flaws might there be in each of those three materialist views of mental states?
 - My presentation of the three materialist views of mental states considered lots of criticisms that employed *possible counterexamples*. How does that style of argumentation work?

3. Some sample questions

True or false?

- (1) Parallelists think that the mind is a physical thing.
- (2) Functionalism claims that mental states are identical to brain states.
- (3) Materialism takes the body to be a physical thing.
- (4) Idealism takes the body to be a physical thing.
- (5) If everything that exists is physical, then dualism and idealism both have to be false.
- (6) If zombies are possible, then the identity theory is true.

(7) According to logical behaviorism, the state of *being in pain* is identical to

- (a) the cause of pain
- (b) the sensory stimuli that bring about pain
- (c) a range of different pain behaviors
- (d) the cause of pain behavior
- (e) a brain state

(8) Consider the following argument:

- (1) The essence of the mind is simply to think.
- (2) The essence of the body is simply to be extended.
- (3) If x and y differ in their essences, then x and y are distinct.

(4) Mind and body are distinct.

Which of the following claims causes the most trouble for premise (1)?

- (a) Bodies have mass, in addition to their being extended.
- (b) Some bodies have no shape or size at all.
- (c) A mind can continue to exist even if there isn't any thinking going on in it.
- (d) Thinking can come in lots of different forms—thinking includes dreaming, sensing, imagining, judging, and understanding.
- (e) If two things are distinct from one another, then they must differ in their essences.

(9) If mutants are possible, then:

- (a) it's possible for there to be a being that's physically indistinguishable from us, but it has no mental states at all.
- (b) it's possible for there to be a mind with no thinking going on in it.
- (c) it's impossible for there to be beings with firing C-fibers that aren't in pain.
- (d) it's possible for there to be beings with firing C-fibers that aren't in pain.
- (e) none of these

(10) If logical behaviorism is true, then is a computer running a really good chess-playing program *thinking*?

- (a) yes
- (b) no
- (c) it depends on whether it's the Mac version of the program or the PC one